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In a recent article, Biederman and Bar (1999) present
several results to support ‘‘a class of theories [that]
assumes that non-accidental properties (NAPS) might
be exploited so that even novel objects can be recog-
nized under depth rotation’’ — specifically, theories
based on ‘geons’ (Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Bieder-
man, 1992). Biederman and Bar likewise present results
that they believe to be inconsistent with a ‘‘class of
theories … based on generalization from templates
specified by metric properties’’ — specifically, ‘view-
based’ or ‘image-based’ theories (Bricolo, Poggio, &
Logothetis, 1997; Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Tarr &
Bu¨lthoff, 1995, 1998). Because our disagreements with
Biederman’s theoretical approach have been detailed in
many other forums (Hayward & Tarr, 1997; Tarr &
Bu¨lthoff, 1995, 1998) we do not feel it is necessary to
respond in kind. We do feel, however, that it is neces-
sary to address a series of straightforwardly incorrect
claims made by Biederman and Bar regarding our
published results. Below we enumerate these claims,
and our replies to each2:
1. ‘‘A task in which subjects are trained with arbitrary
names for a particular pose of an object (Tarr, Williams,
Hayward, & Gauthier, 1998, Experiment 3; Haywood
(sic) & Tarr, 1997, Experiment 2), particularly if the
distinguishing information is difficult to discriminate, is
problematic insofar as pose is part of what is learned and,
potentially, used’’ (p. 2895).
According to this statement, our cited experiments
produced results that are artifactual because names for
objects were learned only at specific viewpoints. There
are at least three reasons to conclude that no such
problems exist. First, in these and other studies, we
obtained the same pattern of viewpoint dependency
with identification (naming) tasks and with Biederman
and Bar’s preferred same–different matching tasks
(Hayward & Tarr, 1997; Tarr, Bu¨lthoff, Zabinski, &
Blanz, 1997; Tarr et al., 1998). Moreover, we almost
always employed a same–different matching procedure
that was identical to (and intentionally based on) that
used by Biederman and Gerhardstein (1993).
Second, in these same three studies (Hayward &
Tarr, 1997; Tarr et al., 1997; Tarr et al., 1998) we
explicitly used stimuli (‘geons’ and ‘geon objects’) which
were extremely easy to discriminate. Indeed, most stim-
uli were almost identical to those used by Biederman
and Gerhardstein (1993). These studies show the same
pattern of responses as studies using highly similar
objects that are difficult to discriminate (e.g. Tarr, 1995;
Tarr & Pinker, 1989). Thus, there is relatively little
evidence, as suggested by Biederman and Bar, that
recognition of highly similar objects is qualitatively
different from recognition of geons (for additional evi-
dence, see Hayward & Williams, in press).
Third, Biederman and Bar appear to be intimating
that pose should be divorced from training on novel
objects. To the extent that this is possible, it has
certainly been accomplished in several studies, either by
presenting animated objects rotating back and forth in
depth (Bu¨lthoff & Edelman, 1992; Edelman & Bu¨lthoff,
1992), by training subjects with the standard and mir-
ror-reversed versions of each object (so that subjects
would never have to do the equivalent of distinguishing
a p from a q or a b from a d) (Tarr, 1995; Tarr &
Pinker, 1989), or by training subjects with multiple
views of each object (Tarr, 1995; Tarr & Gauthier,
1998; Tarr & Pinker, 1989). Such manipulations would
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 852-26096195; fax: 852-
26035019.
E-mail addresses: william-hayward@cuhk.edu.hk (W.G. Hayward),
michael–tarr@brown.edu (M.J. Tarr).
1 Comments can also be addressed to MJT. Tel.: 1-401-8631148;
fax: 1-401-8632255.
2 Because some of the points raised in this letter relate directly to
the appearance of stimuli we have used in various experiments,
readers are encouraged to examine our stimuli for themselves — all
of which are available for download at our web site: http:::
www.cog.brown.edu: tarr.
0042-6989:00:$ - see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S00 4 2 -6989 (00 )00179 -6
W.G. Hayward, M.J. Tarr : Vision Research 40 (2000) 3895–38993896
seem to dissociate shape and orientation as experimen-
tal confounds, yet results of all these studies show clear
viewpoint dependence. Thus, any concatenation of ob-
ject shape and viewpoint in our studies must almost
certainly be a consequence of the nature of mental
representations of objects, not idiosyncratic training
conditions.
2. ‘‘… many of the 6iews in Tarr et al. (1998) were,
in fact, near accidents that required, for example, deter-
mination of whether a single small contour was straight
or slightly cur6ed to distinguish one object from another ’’
(pp. 2895–6).
In responding to this point, it is important to reiter-
ate that we used objects (geons) that were identical to
those used in Biederman’s earlier work and that we
matched the specific viewpoints of each object to the
viewpoints used by Biederman and Gerhardstein
(1993). Consider that in one instance (Tarr et al., 1998;
Experiments 1a and 2a) we went so far as to digitally
scan the actual objects and viewpoints illustrated in
their paper and simply used these identical images in
our study.
Moreover, the observed data do not support Bieder-
man and Bar’s conclusion. As evidence, they cite differ-
ences in the false alarm rates in comparable tasks from
their earlier study (Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993)
and our study (Tarr et al., 1998). First, the high false
alarm rates reported by Biederman and Gerhardstein
(1993) (sometimes as high as 60–100 and 15–20%
overall) indicate that subjects had relatively low sensi-
tivity in discriminating targets from distractors. In con-
trast, our subjects had relatively higher sensitivity for
the same discriminations. Since we presume the goal of
any theory of recognition is accurate recognition, it
seems more likely that the poor performance obtained
by Biederman and Gerhardstein does not reflect stan-
dard recognition processes.
3. ‘‘Before considering the details of how confounds of
resolution and other factors might ha6e artifactually
produced rotation costs in these other studies, we note
that there is independent e6idence that resolution 6aria-
tions may be sufficient to produce the obser6ed rotation
costs. Curiously, most such experiments reporting signifi-
cant slopes with (presumably) distincti6e NAPs ha6e
studied relati6ely small rotation angles, up to 90° and, in
some cases, only to about 30° (Haywood (sic) & Tarr,
1997)’’ (p. 2896).
This statement implies that the use of small rotation
angles (as opposed to a 180° range) in some of our
studies restricts our tests of viewpoint invariance to
conditions where we were more likely to find viewpoint
costs. Such an interpretation is unwarranted.
First, small rotations provide the strongest test of the
two theories in question. Across large rotations of an
object, changes in its image are almost always far more
dramatic, including changes in visible surfaces, changes
in configuration, and, perhaps most importantly,
changes in NAPs (Tarr & Kriegman, 1999). Thus, large
rotations are highly likely to produce performance
costs, but these are often uninterpretable in that they
may be attributed in a theory-appropriate way to either
viewpoint-dependent normalization mechanisms or to
mismatches between different structural descriptions.
Indeed, Biederman and Gerhardstein (1993) heavily
emphasize this point — making it clear that studies
that test view invariance across changes in NAPs do
not provide data that bear on whether human recogni-
tion is view invariant as per Biederman’s stated theory.
In contrast, small rotations allow us to test whether
visual recognition is indeed viewpoint dependent even
in instances where relatively little visual information
changes between rotations. For example, in our experi-
ments using rotations only up to 30° (Hayward & Tarr,
1997), there were no changes to the 6isible parts of any
of the objects shown in the study. We believed that this
manipulation allowed us to compare the predictions of
view-based theories with those of Biederman’s theory.
The combination of Biederman and Bar’s suggestion
that such small rotations are inappropriate and Bieder-
man and Gerhardstein’s (1993, 1995) observation that
larger rotations suffer from changes in visible parts
results in an extremely restricted range of conditions for
which Biederman’s theory still holds: those that are
large enough to remove so-called ‘resolution con-
founds’, but small enough that they do not change
which parts are visible.
Second, just as the literature indicates that viewpoint
costs do not depend upon the type of stimuli used in an
experiment (point c1), it also shows costs across pre-
cisely the range of viewpoints advocated by Biederman
and Bar. For example, the range of viewpoints used in
Tarr et al. (1998) spanned 180°; 90° in each direction
from the training viewpoint. Moreover, Hayward
(1998) found viewpoint costs in a recognition study
across a 180° rotation. Many studies in other laborato-
ries have found similar results across large rotations
(Lawson & Humphreys, 1996; Newell & Findlay, 1997;
Srinivas, 1995).
Finally, we object to Biederman and Bar’s character-
ization of the shape differences used in our studies as
‘presumably’ NAP differences. Even those objects (e.g.
from Hayward & Tarr, 1997) that were not directly
based on stimuli used in Biederman and Gerhardstein
(1993) have clear NAP differences as defined by Bieder-
man (1987). In addition, all our stimuli are available for
inspection in our papers and on the web.
4. ‘‘From a 6iew-based perspecti6e, a rotation of 180°
or mirror-reflection of a bilaterally symmetrical object
would be expected to produce enormous rotation costs,
relati6e to these slight rotation angles’’ (p. 2896).
To make this assumption, Biederman and Bar adopt
an interpretation of view-based theories as metric ‘tem-
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plate’ theories, a point made frequently in their paper.
Even many of the earliest instantiations of view-based
models predict mirror-reflection invariance for objects
that show the same features in the front and back (e.g.
Poggio & Edelman, 1990). More recent models make
this prediction much more explicit, specifically model-
ing the non-linearities that occur at 180° in physiologi-
cal data recording from monkeys (Bricolo et al., 1997;
Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999). Moreover, these models
are not metric templates in the simplistic sense that
Biederman and Bar suggest. For instance, they often
employ a hierarchy of image-based features to represent
and recognize objects. As such they exhibit invariance
over mirror-reflections because the same local image-
based features will be present in both the standard and
mirror versions of an image. Similarly, models using
image-based features are invariant across many of the
image changes that arise from configural deformations,
and changes in translation and scale.
Moreover, the recognition of objects across mirror-
reflections is not the same as the recognition of objects
across 180° rotations in depth. If the objects in question
have different features visible in their front and back
views (as with almost all objects other than those that
are radially symmetric), then a 180° rotation changes
the actual visible structure of the image, not only the
parity of the object’s contours. For example, Bieder-
man’s studies on this issue have often used a 3:4’s view
of an airplane either pointing to the left or to the right;
in contrast, a 180° rotation from one of these views
would reveal features on the back of the airplane that
are unseen from the initial view. Thus, the data cited by
Biederman and Bar (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a,b;
Stankiewicz, Hummel, & Cooper, 1998) do not bear on
the issue of whether human recognition performance is
invariant for the 180° case.
5. ‘‘The procedures of the present in6estigation were
designed to minimize the artifacts that can lead to appar-
ent rotation costs with stimuli that differ in NAPs. The
essential point here is that rotation in depth tends to
produce drastic changes in the 2D image that can differ-
entially affect the perceptibility of the parts’’ (p. 2896).
This statement implies that earlier studies obtained
viewpoint costs because the perceptibility of the stimu-
lus images differed across rotations. First, the critical
finding is not simply that depth rotations hinder recog-
nition performance. Rather, in many studies we (and
others) have obtained a systematic (and usually
monotonic) increase in recognition costs as objects are
rotated further from trained or known views (Bu¨lthoff
& Edelman, 1992; Edelman & Bu¨lthoff, 1992; Gauthier
& Tarr, 1997; Lawson, Humphreys, & Watson, 1994;
Tarr, 1995; Tarr et al., 1997; Tarr & Gauthier, 1998;
Tarr & Pinker, 1989, 1990; Tarr et al., 1998). For this
systematic pattern to be an artifact, it would have to be
the case that larger rotations progressi6ely produced
greater disturbances to the perceptibility of the stimuli
(not simply in the difference between the known image
and the image following rotation).
Second, in Hayward and Tarr (1997), Tarr et al.
(1997) and Tarr et al. (1998), we employed a sequential-
matching task in which we rendered many views for
each object and generated equal magnitude rotations by
using pairs of views separated by the appropriate depth
rotation. Thus, data on a rotation of particular magni-
tude are the result of many different pairs of views.
Given that view pairs from such an equivalence class
consistently produced highly similar performance, it
seems unlikely that differences in ‘perceptibility’ just
happen to be equal for each such pair in an equivalence
class. Moreover, one of the critical predictions of view-
based models, a systematic increase in recognition costs
with increasing separation in depth rotation, was once
again found when these equivalence classes were com-
pared to one another. That is, equal magnitude view
pairs consistently yielded better performance when the
depth separation was small and progressively poorer
performance as the depth separation increased. It is
therefore essentially impossible that on large rotations
one or both of the stimuli were difficult to perceive, but
on small rotations they were easy to perceive. Rather,
across large rotations observers had greater difficulty
determining that the two images represented different
views of the same object.
6. ‘‘Rendered images, as compared to line drawings,
typically ha6e lower contrast and illumination and
shadow contours that can increase the difficulty of deter-
mining the orientation and depth discontinuities impor-
tant for resol6ing the geons. Such resolution difficulties
characterize the object images in the Tarr et al. (1997)
and Haywood (sic) and Tarr (1997) experiments’’ (p.
2896).
This statement clearly indicates that Biederman and
Bar believe that rendered images (e.g. photorealistically
shaded images of 3D objects) are somehow less appro-
priate stimuli than line drawings for studying human
visual recognition. First, we strongly argue against the
notion that line drawings provide a more suitable stim-
ulus domain than rendered images. Not only is it
trivially obvious that ‘real-world’ recognition always
involves recognition of textured and shaded objects
against richly textured and shaded backgrounds, but it
is not even clear that the human visual system can
extract the kind of line drawing that Biederman and his
collaborators have used in their studies (Kurbat, 1994;
Sanocki, Bowyer, Heath, & Sarkar, 1998).
Second, in all of our studies using rendered images,
the stimuli contained regions of high contrast around
the outlines of the objects, and these outlines often
provided sufficient NAP differences to perform the
recognition task (see also Hayward, 1998). Thus, even if
rendered images can be made difficult to perceive by
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intentionally embedding them in cluttered scenes,
we never used such manipulations to idiosyn-
cratically enhance the potential effects of depth rota-
tions.
Third, this point ignores at least two published find-
ings. Tarr et al. (1998) used rendered images
and line drawings of the identical objects – the latter
being scanned in directly from Biederman and Ger-
hardstein (1993). In that study we obtained nearly
indistinguishable results for the rendered versions and
line drawing versions of the stimuli. Likewise, Bieder-
man and Ju (1988) compared recognition of line draw-
ings and color photographs of objects. As in our
study, they found no consistent differences in patterns
of recognition for the two types of stimuli, and con-
cluded that colored photographic images can be iden-
tified about as quickly as line drawings of the same
objects.
7. ‘‘Biederman and Bar argued that these transient
shifts were the reason why, in the Haywood (sic) and
Tarr (1997) and Tarr et al. (1997) studies, a rotation
from 0° to a slight angle, say 30°, produced greater costs
than rotations from greater angles, say from 60° to 90°.
The opposite would be expected from the template ex-
trapolation:mental rotation routines argued by Tarr
(1995)’’ (p. 2896).
We are unsure of the specific claim here. One inter-
pretation is that we found viewpoint costs which were
larger at 30° than at any other rotation. A
second interpretation is that the difference between no
rotation and 30° was larger than the difference between
rotating 60° and rotating 90°. Both of these claims are
incorrect.
In absolute terms, rotation costs in our studies al-
most always increase monotonically, so that costs at
60° are larger than costs at 30°, and costs at
90° are larger than those at 60°. Such is the case
in the specific studies that Biederman and Bar cite: In
Tarr et al. (1997) rotation costs were always greater for
the 60° and the 90° rotation conditions as compared to
the 30° condition. In Hayward and Tarr (1997) we
never tested beyond 30°, but the 10° and 20° rotation
conditions always produced smaller rotation costs.
Likewise, in a third relevant study, Tarr et al. (1998)
used rotations of 45° and 90° and across nine experi-
ments and found that the 90° condition always pro-
duced larger rotation costs as compared to the 45°
condition.
In relative terms, the rotation costs we have found in
these three studies are almost always a function of the
magnitude of the rotation difference, which results in
any 30° difference in rotations, e.g. 0–30° or 60–90°,
having a similar effect on performance. Critically view-
based theories predict this pattern, that is, equi6alent
costs for equal magnitude rotations, not larger costs for
the 60–90° case as compared to the 0–30° case as
Biederman and Bar’s statement would suggest (‘‘The
opposite would be expected …’’)3.
In addition, we are skeptical regarding the existence
of the ‘transient shift’ detectors which are hypothesized
to detect a change to the image when there is no spatial
translation between two sequentially presented stimuli.
To our knowledge, there is no evidence that in a
sequential-matching paradigm across a masked, 750 ms
interstimulus interval, ‘‘IT cells have a transient re-
sponse, originating in the magnocellular system, to any
stimulus change’’ (p. 2887). Any magnocellular cell
responses will be driven by the mask, and so it seems
physiologically implausible that these neurons,
750 ms later, are able to revert to some pre-mask firing
state to assist in the recognition judgment. In addition,
there is behavioral evidence that a masked ISI
as brief as 100 ms successfully eliminates image-based
(or iconic) processing from recognition judgments (Ellis
& Allport, 1986). Finally, the issue of whether tran-
sients are responsible for apparent rotation costs has
been tested in recent experiments. Hayward and
Williams (in press) conducted a sequential-matching
task for objects that contained NAP differences, and,
on each trial, presented the two stimuli in different
spatial locations. This is precisely the manipulation
advocated by Biederman and Bar in order to eliminate
the transient. In this study, however, Hayward and
Williams obtained exactly the same type of monotoni-
cally increasing viewpoint cost functions observed in
our earlier work.
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